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Distinctly Divergent or Hanging onto English Coat Tails? Drug Policy in Post-Devolution 
Wales 
 
Dr David Brewster and Dr Robert Jones 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The process of Welsh devolution has marshalled major political, social and institutional change. 
Whilst scholars within various disciplines have attempted to make sense of these changes, the 
discipline of criminology remains something of an exception. This article offers an examination 
of the unique Welsh criminal justice policy space that has been opened up by devolution in Wales. 
The paper provides a long overdue assessment of how drug policy in Wales, while continuing to 
straddle the UK Government’s criminal justice responsibilities, is configured and shaped within 
post-devolution Wales. The empirical findings presented here reveal the existence of a distinct 
Welsh drug policy as well as discovering clear limitations to Welsh policy divergence. The article 
outlines the need for criminologists to take Wales – and the Welsh policy space – more seriously, 
while highlighting the need for criminologists to become more attuned to the considerable effects 
being made by constitutional change. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the course of the last twenty years, the United Kingdom (UK) has undergone 
extraordinary constitutional change. In 1998, the UK Parliament passed three devolution Acts. 
The Scotland Act, The Government of Wales Act and the Northern Ireland Act established new 
political institutions and oversaw the transfer of some powers and functions previously held by 
the UK Government (UKG) in Westminster. In the time that has elapsed, the devolution 
settlements of each constituent part of the UK have undergone yet further transformation. This 
includes, inter alia, a referendum on primary law making powers in Wales, the introduction of a 
new devolution dispensation in Scotland1, as well as the transfer of policing and justice powers 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly. These developments have further contributed to the emergence 
of an ‘asymmetric’ set of governance relations whereby devolved polities now have varying 
powers to craft legislation and policy across, as well as within, different fields. 
 
The changes that have been catalysed by devolution have been reflected within the research 
agendas of criminologists across parts of the UK, including Scotland (see Croall et al., 2010; 
McAra, 2008) and Northern Ireland (McAlinden and Dwyer, 2015; O’Mahony, 2012). In Wales, 
however, with a few notable exceptions (Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2010), criminologists have 
provided very little coverage of the impact made by Welsh devolution to its role within the 
England & Wales system. Consequently, debates on criminal justice in Wales continue to be 
characterised by a presumed policy linearity with Westminster. This discourse is one that 
consistently fails to comprehend the vastly more complex and interweaving negotiations of 
power and agenda setting that now occur within the governable space of Wales. As Stenson and 
Edwards (2004: 219) pertinently argued over a decade ago, there is a need for criminologists to 
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consider “the uneven ways in which political rationalities and governmental technologies are 
configured in different localities by competing coalitions of actors”.  
 
This article explores the ‘uneven ways’ in which drug policy is configured within post-devolution 
Wales. The first section of the paper explains how the combined processes of Welsh devolution 
and changes to UKG criminal justice policy are responsible for delivering major changes to 
Wales’ position within the supposed ‘unitary’ England & Wales system. From here, through 
drawing upon empirical research into drug policy in Wales, the article presents a much-needed 
analysis of the ways in which this Welsh policy space is being used. This includes a discussion 
of the extent to which Welsh drug policy is divergent from that of England, as well as offering 
an original analysis of some of the limitations to Welsh policy divergence. By framing the 
emergence of a distinctive Welsh criminological policy space, and exploring some of the 
important issues within it, this article illustrates the need for criminologists to think beyond 
‘England & Wales’ as a unit of analysis despite the continuing formal existence of the unitary 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Emergence of Wales 
 
The England & Wales system was created during the sixteenth century with one central aim: to 
legally incorporate Wales into England. While sweeping away many of the “customs and usages” 
that had once included Wales’ very own penal code (Rawlings, 2003: 460), the formation of the 
single jurisdiction was responsible for producing dominant ways of talking about criminal justice 
policy. The absorption of Wales ensured that it was to be rendered invisible from debates on 
crime control and criminal justice (Jones, 2017). As such, Wales was – and indeed has been ever 
since – simply spoken of through the dominant position assumed by England. This has been 
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reflected within a range of different studies on criminal justice that, by speaking solely about 
England on the behalf of both England and Wales, have helped to conjure up ‘common sense’ 
characterisations of “English criminal justice” as well as an active “English criminological 
tradition” that has helped to shape criminal justice policy in England and Wales from the 
nineteenth century onwards (see Radzinowicz and Hood, 1986; Rutherford, 1988: 136). 
 
The legacy of this anglocentric narrative is that, so long as the England & Wales system remains 
intact, it is deemed perfectly acceptable to speak on the behalf of Wales through the dominant 
position of England. However, while the England & Wales system remains formally in place to 
this day, at least in name, the combined effect of changes to criminal justice policy and the start 
of executive devolution to Wales has been responsible for a radical, yet rather inconspicuous, 
transformation to Wales’s role within a jurisdiction supposedly characterized by the abolition of 
difference.  
 
Welsh Devolution 
 
The short history of Welsh devolution is marked by continuous iteration, development and 
change. Although administrative devolution to Wales first began during the middle of the 
twentieth century, the Government of Wales Act 1998 heralded the beginning of executive 
devolution with functions previously held by the UK Secretary of State for Wales in Whitehall 
transferred to the newly established National Assembly for Wales in Cardiff.  
 
By the middle of the millennium’s first decade, having taken on a number of different faces 
during its early formative years (Rawlings, 2003), the Welsh Assembly was well on its way to 
becoming a more orthodox parliamentary structure. The Government of Wales Act 2006 
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conferred some legislative powers to the National Assembly, however, it was not until 2011, 
following a successful ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012), that full 
primary law making powers were given to the National Assembly. This outcome led to yet 
another inquiry into the future of Welsh devolution, also referred to as the Silk Commission, 
which has helped to shape some of the most recent constitutional developments. 
 
When its findings were published in 2013 and 2014, the Silk Commission recommended a 
number of modifications, including the transfer of some tax raising powers to Wales, as well as 
calling for a move towards a “superior” reserved powers model (Silk Commission, 2014: 37). 
The UK Government, although largely rejecting many of the Commission’s recommendations2, 
legislated to provide Welsh Ministers with tax raising powers (Wales Act 2014) as well as 
introduce a reserved powers model (Wales Act 2017). In January 2017, the Wales Act 2017 
became Wales’ third devolution dispensation in less than a twenty-year period. 
 
The rather condensed tale of Welsh constitutional development that has been told here illustrates 
the many ‘gear changes’ that Welsh devolution has gone through since its early beginnings 
(Rawlings, 2015). Importantly, however, what remains clear is that since becoming formally 
empowered in April 1999, the newly formed democratic institutions in Wales have been formally 
responsible for twenty separate areas of government. Although this still does not extend to 
criminal justice powers in Wales, the Welsh Government’s (WG)3 control over many social 
policy functions was key – and indeed still is – to shaping the identity of Welsh devolution. As 
argued by Chaney and Drakeford (2004: 123-4), the “essence” of early Welsh devolution had 
been to create a “social policy Assembly for Wales”, with a significant amount of the WG’s 
entire budget spent on areas such as health4, education, housing and social services. Crucially, it 
is the WG’s control over these areas that is key to understanding Wales’ changing role within the 
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England & Wales system. In particular, as the process of Welsh executive devolution began, the 
social policy responsibilities being handed over to Welsh Ministers in Cardiff were about to 
assume a central role in the UKG’s ‘modernised’ approach to tackling crime and offending.  
 
‘A Social Policy Assembly’ 
 
In 1997, at the same time that plans for Welsh devolution were being unveiled by the Welsh 
Office (1997), the newly elected New Labour Government outlined its commitment to a different 
approach to tackling crime across England & Wales. Elected at a time when Western states were 
beginning to reconfigure their approaches to tackling crime (Garland, 1996), the New Labour 
Government embarked itself on a “relentless quest” to “modernize” state institutions 
(McLaughlin et al., 2001: 305). At the heart of its policy was a commitment to delivering ‘joined-
up’ approaches and the need for integrated working between state, local and community agencies. 
This strategy was most clearly evidenced during New Labour’s early years in its approach to 
youth justice (McLaughlin et al., 2001), as well as the introduction of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 (Gilling, 2007). 
 
A central pillar within New Labour’s policy was a commitment to new forms of governance. Its 
plans included reforms at the level of the state itself with an emphasis upon the development of 
“horizontal” coordination and collaboration between state departments and public sector 
organisations (Newman, 2001: 106). Rather than simply responsibilising individuals and groups 
beyond the central government, New Labour’s commitment to joint working meant that non-
criminal justice government departments, including those responsible for tackling drug and 
alcohol misuse, were also drawn in as part of its collaborative efforts to create an “enhanced 
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network” of agencies actively involved in supporting criminal justice institutions to reduce crime 
(Garland, 2001: 124). 
 
From 1999 onwards, this “criminalization of social policy” was being reflected in the ways in 
which social policies were being used by “devolved authorities” to tackle crime and offending, 
including the newly created WG (Rodger, 2008: 3). In Wales, despite being handed no formal 
responsibilities over the criminal justice system, the WG set about using its own social policy 
functions to help tackle crime and lower offending in Wales. From 1999 onwards, for example, 
the WG has introduced provisions to improve offender health (WG, 2005a), education (WG, 
2007), substance misuse (WG, 2008), and housing services (WG, 2015), measures to tackle 
domestic violence (WG, 2010), as well as steps to improve community safety across Wales 
(Edwards and Hughes, 2008).  
 
‘Different Welsh Perspective’ 
 
The significant changes made by devolution forced the UKG to recognise the existence of a 
distinct set of arrangements in Wales (see MoJ, 2014; Wales Office, 2013). No longer able to be 
spoken of through the dominant position of England, a 2006 joint report by National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS) Cymru and the WG (2006: iii) vowed to take full account of “the 
different Welsh perspective” that had been brought about by devolution. Significantly, this 
included an acknowledgement that the WG now enjoyed “considerable autonomy” over policy 
development within pathway areas that were absolutely central to the UKG’s ‘joined-up’ 
approach (NOMS Cymru et al., 2006: 8).  
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Far from being part of any named, deliberate or formal strategy to provide the WG with any kind 
of official responsibility for criminal justice in Wales, the forging of closer ties between social 
policy and criminal justice have simply meant that responsibilities over crime and tackling 
offending have been picked up as part of the WG’s existing strategic programme of government. 
Despite the magnitude of these changes, however, academics continue to disregard the distinct 
policy context that exists in Wales (e.g. Czerniawski, 2016; Forrester et al., 2013). As a response 
to this continuing failure, this paper will showcase the importance of taking Wales seriously by 
offering a critical analysis of the WG’s approach to drug policy. 
 
The Study: Drug Policy and Devolution in Wales 
 
For almost 100 years, commentators have characterised “British” drug policy by its straddling of 
several policy spheres, and most notably that of health and criminal justice (see Berridge, 1984; 
Stevens, 2017). With powers over the misuse of drugs or psychoactive substances reserved to the 
UKG5, analyses of drug policy in Wales have largely been absent or otherwise framed as a silent, 
and emulative, player in discussions of “Britain”, “UK”, or “England & Wales”6 (see Monaghan, 
2012; Duke, 2013; Shiner, 2013). However, the enduring feature of “health” and other related 
social policy spheres has ensured that Wales, in the post-devolution era, has become more 
actively involved in the crafting of policy decisions and legislation on areas that directly pertain 
to drug policy. This has opened up the possibility of a distinctive and divergent approach to that 
of England and/or the UKG. Considering its supposed social democratic and welfarist principles 
(Drakeford and Gregory, 2011), it could be expected that Wales has the ability to generate 
strategies and approaches which are more ‘adaptive’ in nature (Garland, 2001), and which are 
more resistant to overly punitive measures than that found in England. 
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Despite the emergence of a Welsh criminal justice policy space, the trend of neglecting drug 
policy in Wales in favour of reinforcing the hegemony of a “UK” approach remains dominant. 
As illustrated within a recent journal article by Duke et al., (2013: 971), who, in a footnote, state 
that devolved strategies are merely ‘…coordinated within the overall UK strategy’. It is 
problematic, if not concerning, just how little academic attention, with the exception of some 
notable evaluative studies (e.g. Bennett and Holloway, 2011; Bennett et al., 2013), has been 
directed towards this policy sphere. By taking Wales as the central unit of analysis, the remainder 
of this paper will empirically examine how this Welsh space has diverged from the broader UK 
(or Westminster) approach to drug policy, as well as exploring the extent to which that a distinct 
Welsh approach to drug policy may in fact be limited.  
 
The data used in this paper is drawn from a broader project that examined the policy-making 
processes relating to cannabis in England & Wales (E&W) and the Netherlands (NL). More 
specifically, it compared the 2009 reclassification of cannabis from Class C to Class B (E&W) 
to the 2012/13 changes to the ‘coffeeshop’ tolerance policy (NL). The research design was a 
multiple-embedded case study and compared two ‘national’ cases and two ‘subnational’ cases in 
order to decipher the nature and extent of convergence and divergence in policy-making 
processes, and what this signified in terms of contemporary cultures of control (Brewster, 2017). 
For the purposes of this paper, this provided a useful and interesting way in which to explore the 
development and projection of drug policy in Wales and how it navigated a legislative change 
which was beyond the power of the WG.	
 
The paper draws upon a reading of official Welsh drug strategy policy documents (WG, 2000; 
WG, 2008) as well as qualitative data from a series of interviews with policy stakeholders in 
Wales (n=10), which included senior political figures (SPF) (3), senior civil servants (SCS) from 
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WG (3), and senior practitioners working in health and police services (SPO) (4). Participants 
were recruited through purposive and reputational sampling. Documents and organisations were 
identified from a review of the literature as being relevant and involved in drug policy, and 
identified contacts were sent formal emails or letters explaining the research and inviting their 
participation in the study. Data collection occurred between 2011-2013. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and lasted on average 40 minutes and were recorded and transcribed. 
Kingdon’s (1995) Multiple Streams model of policy-making was used as a ‘middle-range’ 
analytical framework to thematically code and sort both the interview and documentary data into 
different policy ‘streams’, as well as allowing for in-vivo codes to emerge from the data itself. 
Together this enabled the study to critically compare processes of policy change across the 
different cases in terms of convergence and divergence7. 	
 
For this paper, the analysis presented takes a less rigid form than that of the Multiple Streams 
model, in order to explore the development of drug policy in Wales as a whole, whilst still 
drawing upon prominent themes that emerged in relation to the cannabis reclassification in 2009. 
Next, through intertwining findings from both the interviews and drug strategies, the substantive 
empirical analysis discusses the extent of divergence in drug policy in Wales. First, the claims 
for a distinctive approach are considered, before turning to critically examine the limitations of 
divergence.	
 
A Distinct Welsh Drug Policy 
 
In support of a distinct Welsh drug policy, this section will first explore various manifestations 
of divergence that can be detected in policy ‘talk’ and ‘action’ in Wales (Politt, 2001). Then, it 
will seek to contextualise and explain this through charting the growth of the ‘substance misuse’ 
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policy machinery and illuminating components of Welsh political culture which have facilitated 
these developments.	
 
In several important ways, contemporary drug policy in Wales demonstrates a more rational, 
inclusive and innovative approach than can be found in England. While it may well be possible 
to point towards the beginnings of a unique Welsh approach via the Welsh Office (McBride et 
al., 1998)8, executive devolution to Wales in 1999 was the major catalyst for policy divergence 
as it enabled actors, agencies and institutions in Wales to gain more influence and power in the 
crafting and administering of drug policy. Whilst continuing to straddle criminal justice (Rodger, 
2008), the dominant approach taken in Wales is that of health and particularly harm reduction.  
 
The claim to a distinctive approach can be clearly identified through both official rhetoric and 
the introduction and support of policy initiatives by the WG. First and foremost, nowhere is this 
approach more clearly on show than in the language of ‘substance misuse’. This lies in stark 
contrast to the separate strategies towards alcohol and illicit drugs in England, as well as the shift 
towards an abstinence-based ‘recovery’ approach at the UK level (Monaghan, 2012). The central 
positioning of ‘substance misuse’ and ‘harm reduction’ rhetoric in Wales is not just political 
posturing, but it has major consequences for how problems are recognised, responses organised, 
and resources allocated at a central (WG) level of decision making. 
 
In terms of Welsh-specific policies, there are several examples that demonstrate distinctiveness. 
In 2004, for example, the WG’s introduction of a Transitional Support Service (TSS) marked its 
major commitment to tackling substance misuse amongst Welsh prison leavers. Introduced to 
help address the shortfall in support for prisoners only serving short-term sentences (see Maguire 
et al., 2000), TSS quickly developed a reputation as a “very effective practice model” – and one 
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that clearly diverged from England – for delivering ‘through the gate’ support aimed specifically 
at short-term prisoners from Wales suffering from substance misuse (Maguire et al., 2010: iv).  
 
In a further example, the use of Naloxone in Wales has gained significant attention in policy 
circles for its use in preventing opiate overdoses. Whilst this is available in England, it does not 
receive central UKG funding which makes provision more sporadic and based upon local 
commissioning decisions. In Wales, however, since 2011 it has been centrally (WG) managed 
and funded and has been rolled out nationally. 
 
Finally, in 2013 the WG formally supported the ‘Welsh Emerging Drugs and Identification of 
Novel Substances’ (WEDINOS) to provide a mechanism to allow the public to test unknown or 
unidentified substances, whilst offering better public information about potentially dangerous or 
contaminated substances on the market. Although there are also pill and powder testing services 
in England, which have recently gained some traction9, these are not yet endorsed by the UKG 
and appear to lie in tension with the direction towards an abstinence-based approach.  
 
Importantly, the examples highlighted here demonstrate some pertinent differences from UKG 
drug policy, both in terms of policy ‘talk’ as well as ‘action’ (Pollitt, 2001). As will be further 
explained below, these manifestations of difference are connected to the increased policy 
machinery that has developed around drug policy in Wales as well as the political culture that 
has come to govern the way in which drug policies in Wales are created.  
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‘Brand Wales’ – Policy Machinery and Political Culture 
 
The early years of post-devolution drug policy in Wales provided little by way of genuine policy 
distinctiveness. The WG’s (2000) first drug strategy, Tackling Substance Misuse in Wales, 
included some subtle additions to the UKG’s own Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain 
strategy (Home Office, 1998), but the differences appeared to be minor beyond a continuation of 
the rhetorical commitment to a health-based harm reduction approach that had developed during 
the Welsh Office years. As executive devolution developed during its early formative years 
(Rawlings, 2003), however, drug policy in Wales began to take on a more divergent and 
autonomous character. 
 
The period that separates the publication of the WG’s first substance misuse strategy in 2000 and 
its second, and current strategy, Working Together to Reduce Harm in 2008, is key to 
understanding the development of a distinct Welsh drug policy. First, as confidence in the 
maturity and resilience of Welsh devolution grew, this came to be reflected in an expanded policy 
machinery surrounding substance misuse in Wales. Supported by increased levels of central 
(WG) funding 10 , this expanded machinery has been complimented by improvements in 
recording, monitoring and analysing Welsh-specific substance misuse data. This process 
formally began in 2006 with the decision to introduce the Welsh National Database for Substance 
Misuse. According to one SCS who was involved in its creation, prior to this ‘…there was no 
information, no data’ which limited the WG’s ability to respond to, and manage, the drug problem 
in Wales.  
 
In constructing representations of substance misuse problems specific to a Welsh-defined 
context, the expanded Welsh drug policy machinery has been able to claim greater ownership 
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over issues and provided the rationale and legitimacy to craft responses tailored to those specific 
problems. For example, the overt recognition that ‘the harmful use of alcohol in Wales is far 
more widespread than that of illegal drugs and other substances’ lends credibility to a joint 
approach to substance misuse as a whole, partly because it ‘…enables local commissioners to 
target resources in proportion to the relative harms of drug misuse and alcohol misuse in their 
area’ (WG, 2008:12). 
 
The bureaucratisation of substance misuse, and of ‘…wanting to embed a culture of evidence-
based practice’ (SCS 2, WG), is not a development specific to Wales given the ‘modernising 
agenda’ that New Labour had embarked upon at the same time (McLaughlin et al., 2001; Rodger, 
2008). However, whilst authors have often articulated the more punitive criminal justice-based 
manifestations of managerialist influences in England (UK) at that time (Duke 2006; Seddon et 
al., 2008), in Wales, an expanded policy machinery has helped to propel a more dominant health-
based approach which has solidified an identity, or ‘brand’, around harm reduction. Thus, a set 
of frameworks have been created which project Wales as commanding a distinct entity and 
position on the issue of substance misuse. This is evidenced, for example, in the Framework for 
Community Safety Partnerships to Commission Substance Misuse Services (WG, 2005b), the 
Comprehensive Performance Management Framework (see WG, 2008: 16), and the Substance 
Misuse Treatment Framework (see WG, 2008: 73-75).  
 
The second driver behind a distinct Welsh drug policy is the political culture operating within the 
expanded policy machinery. A reading of the 2008-2018 strategy indicates a more definitive shift 
in the rhetoric towards an autonomous approach than in previous strategies. For example, this 
marks a transformation in terms of the relationship with the UKG, with the current strategy 
projecting one of equal partnership rather than the asymmetrical dependency which characterised 
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previous strategies: ‘…it requires the WG and UKG to work together on issues which cross the 
boundary of devolved and non-devolved areas of responsibility’, creating ‘links with UKG 
strategies’ (WG, 2008: 19).  
 
The shift in rhetoric was driven forward at a time when other organisations, including NOMS, 
were forced to acknowledge the extent of the WG’s involvement in shaping and implementing 
criminal justice policy in Wales (NOMS Cyrmu et al., 2006). For those operating within the 
policy machinery in Wales, the emergence of a distinct culture amongst policy insiders reflects 
the growing strength, maturity and confidence of political institutions in Wales. In relation to the 
area of substance misuse, policy insiders confidently claim that a distinct political identity 
enables them to produce Welsh-specific policy responses. As one policy stakeholder suggested: 
 
‘It’s no longer about us just hanging on English coat-tails and taking an English policy 
and dragonising it. We don’t do that but we used to do that 20 years ago. But we don’t… 
we develop policies which meet the needs of the Welsh population.’ (SCS 2, WG) 
 
A strong theme, which contributes towards this sense of policy autonomy, is the projection of 
Welsh unity through shared common values and goals. In the accounts of policy insiders are 
refrains to notions of a close-knit community of policy-makers and practitioners (or in their 
language, ‘partners’) (see Drakeford, 2010). In part, this is adjudged to be a result of a set of 
geographical, cultural and historical factors which have served to forge a clear Welsh identity 
and divergence from England: 
 
‘We’ve got common things that we do together, so we are held together by the language 
and that makes, I suppose, a desire with everyone I ever bump into to work together. We 
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want to be integrated, we want to have a brand Wales, we want to be together.’ (SPO and 
WG) 
 
‘I think we are fortunate that we are quite a small nation. The number of partners that we 
have… because we have less regions it is easier for us to work very closely with our 
partners and I think you will probably find that the relationships that we have with our 
partners are probably better and closer than they are in England.’ (SCS 1, WG) 
 
‘…it is a document [substance misuse strategy] that is not a WG document, it’s owned 
by everyone in Wales and you will find if you talk to partners that they will say that.’ 
(SCS 2, WG) 
 
What remains central to our understanding of a distinct Welsh drug policy, however, is that the 
shared values underpinning political culture in Wales translate themselves into shaping the way 
in which Welsh policy insiders view, construct and respond to ‘the problem’ of substance misuse. 
According to one SPF, responses in Wales are framed as being more ‘sympathetic’ towards the 
individual substance user than in England. This sentiment is also clearly outlined within the 
foreword to the 2008 strategy, which states that ‘…the needs of the substance misuser, their 
families and the wider community must be at the heart of everything we do’ (WG, 2008: iii). 
Crucially, while dominant discourses in Wales centre on the construction of the substance user 
as victim, who should be offered help rather than creating a divide between ‘us’ respectable 
citizens, this approach appears markedly different to the perceived strategy in England: 
	
‘I think the tone at the UK level is still very much a criminal justice driven approach with 
a pretty moral distancing… We are more likely to use the softer language of, these could 
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be people you know, these could be people like you, and if they fall into difficulty we 
ought to be able to help them because you might be in difficulty one day.’ (SPF 1) 
 
The rhetorical difference between the inclusive ‘Working Together’ (WG, 2008) and exclusive 
‘Protecting Families and Communities’ (Home Office, 2008) appears to corroborate the above 
account. The ordering of the ‘action areas’ is not inconsequential either, with the UK strategies’ 
first listed priority that primarily concerning criminal justice (‘protecting communities’/’reducing 
demand’). In the Welsh strategy, this corresponding action area is the last discussed whilst 
‘preventing harm’ comes first. Even according to the perspectives of those working within 
criminal justice in Wales, the influence of health is seen as the dominant voice shaping 
contemporary Welsh drug policy: 
 
‘…we like to think we are independently minded, and we have got health devolved so I 
think the emphasis on treatment and prevention is certainly stronger than enforcement 
because the policing isn’t devolved and neither is the law…’ (SPO and WG) 
 
The ability to move away from UKG policy has only been made possible following the 
emergence of a distinct Welsh policy space. Within this space, however, a broadened policy 
machinery and strong political culture have helped to influence and shape the formation of a 
distinct Welsh drug policy. While responsibilities over criminal justice remain outside of its 
competencies, this has arguably led to a sharpening of those areas in which policy movement is 
possible. The direction of which would appear to be attuned to a political culture which, 
supposedly, favours social welfarist principles (see Davies and Williams, 2009; Morgan, 2002). 
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The Limits of Divergence – Hanging onto (or wedded to) English Coat-Tails? 
 
Despite the emergence and claim of a ‘Welsh approach’ to drugs, this section will consider three 
central issues which have constrained divergence in Wales, namely: insufficient powers; a 
reluctance to campaign for genuine change; and a lack of critical debate around drug policy in 
Wales. While what limited research there is on justice in Wales has tended to focus upon the 
distinct or even progressive elements of Welsh policy (e.g. Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2010), the 
arguments presented here offer a more critical examination of the Welsh criminal justice policy 
space.  
 
Firstly, a distinct Welsh drug policy is restricted by Wales’ devolution dispensation. While Welsh 
ministers and policy makers may be responsible for the policy drivers and controls over health, 
primary-law making powers concerning the control and classification of illicit substances in 
Wales are currently reserved to the UKG11. These controls are principally covered by the Misuse 
of Drugs Act (MDA) 1971 12 , which, inter alia, prohibits the possession, sale, supply and 
production of substances covered under its remit. Other pieces of legislation covering licit 
substances in Wales, such as the Medicines Act 1968, Customs and Excise Management Act 
1979, and the Licensing Act 2003, which predominantly concerns the regulation of how 
substances can be manufactured, distributed and sold, are the responsibility of the UKG. 
 
In respect of all this legislation, the WG has no formal powers to enact, change or resist decisions 
made by the UKG, even where such changes may appear to run counter to the direction and 
wishes of elected officials in Wales. The direct consequence of this is an overt acknowledgement 
from WG that they must work alongside, and accept the decisions of, the UKG. As the current 
substance misuse strategy states, this necessitates ‘pressing the case for legislative change with 
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Whitehall Ministers… or seeking to reach agreement on where Wales and England legislation 
can be varied in Wales’ (WG, 2008:19). This very clearly imposes limitations on any current and 
future claims and desires for a divergent substance misuse policy.  
 
Following on from their inability to control legislation, the second limitation to divergence relates 
to the willingness of Welsh Ministers to campaign the UKG for change. The broader politics of 
crime and drugs control that has been widely noted at the broader UKG level (and beyond) 
generates an imperative for policy makers and politicians to be ‘tough’ on such issues (Seddon 
et al., 2008; Garland, 2001). As such, this affects the extent to which politicians can be reflexive 
about their publicly known positions on drugs policy (see UKDPC, 2012). The research showed 
that this is also felt in the sensitivities and anxieties of Welsh political actors. Indeed, it was felt 
by one SPF that ‘putting your head above the parapet’ to advance more liberal or progressive 
agendas on drug policy could effectively end your career. This is by no means unique to Wales, 
but within the Welsh context, there is limited open political support amongst Ministers or elected 
Assembly Members for alternatives to drug prohibition13.  
 
As a consequence, to speak out about issues such as drug classification and the harm-producing 
role of criminal justice is not perceived to be worth the risk it entails for most political actors. 
This is especially tricky for WG Ministers because substance misuse only equates to a small 
proportion of an extensive portfolio14. Therefore, to be risqué about a relatively modest area may 
have consequences on other aspects of the job that may well carry greater importance for an 
individual and their future career (Stevens, 2011). Moreover, these dynamics are particularly 
conditioned by the relationship between WG and Whitehall, and so there is a sense that the WG 
has to be ‘tentative’ in the ‘fights to fight’: 
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‘…we have a series of difficult discussions that go on between ourselves and Westminster 
Government, would we choose to add this one [drugs legislation] to the list? I think 
probably not, because the other things that are on the list, are, you could argue in some 
ways are more pressing… you always worry that if you introduce another argument into 
that you will lose ground on some more important ones… Would you suddenly start not 
being able to win arguments over here because your attempt to win over here would be 
overshadowed by, undermined by, a different sort of argument.  How could you possibly 
give those people those powers to do that when they’re asking for this mad thing over 
here?’ (SPF 1) 
 
Significantly, even where the WG has demonstrated a willingness to challenge the UKG on 
legislation, which incidentally appears to only concern licit substances, it has also become clear 
that such endeavours are unlikely to result in a favourable outcome. For example, despite the 
continuing efforts being made by Welsh Ministers to have powers over alcohol licensing 
devolved to Wales (see BBC, 2010; WG, 2013), this plan was once again rejected within the 
UKG’s St David’s Day command paper (Wales Office, 2015). In this instance, the WG’s 
demands were somewhat lost within a much broader set of discussions taking place around a 
move towards a reserved powers model, as well as the transfer of further powers to the National 
Assembly.	
 
The third restriction on divergence relates to the fairly narrow nature of policy-making in Wales. 
One criticism levelled at it by a SPF is that there ‘isn’t enough grit in the oyster’, signifying a 
lack of critical debate amongst policy makers about drugs in Wales. Another political figure was 
equally critical of such practices: 
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‘…this fatuous idea that if you get lots of people sitting around a table you pool their 
wisdom, you don’t, you pool their stupidity and their prejudice, and you don’t get sense 
you get prejudice.’ (SPF 2) 
 
As such, there appears to be little willingness to look beyond prohibition for political decisions 
around illicit substances, with seemingly a large range of individuals from politicians to civil 
servants, experts (in the form of APoSM) and practitioners not engaging in the wider debate or 
challenging decisions made in Westminster: 
 
‘…it’s like the debate doesn’t happen at all, so I get very straightforward advice within 
the parameters of the way that policy is currently configured… people like that [APoSM] 
who are not in the government machine but are there to advise it, even there they don’t 
raise it as an issue at all. They simply talk within the tram lines.’ (SPF 1) 
 
‘I don’t see any pressure on the WG to lobby the Westminster Government in opposition 
to any of the decisions around classification, and I don’t see there currently being any 
appetite for them to do that either… those kind of pressures to my knowledge, having 
worked supporting and briefing ministers for some time around this, it’s just not on the 
radar at all.’ (Local Authority/WG Substance Misuse Policy Worker) 
 
Importantly then, this effectively produces a deficit in Wales in what has been termed the 
‘primeval policy soup’ (Kingdon, 1995), with only a narrow set of options made available for 
serious political consideration. In this sense, there appears to be a lack of debate, or even 
acknowledgement amongst politicians15, of alternative ways in which illicit substances could be 
managed at the UK level which could potentially allow for the WG’s harm-reductive aims to be 
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more straightforwardly achieved. Pervasive managerialist rhetoric such as ‘…making sure that 
services are equipped to meet the health needs of substance users is our top priority’ and 
‘developing policies and strategies we know work’ [SM Policy Worker, emphasis added] are all 
based within an acceptance of a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Becker, 1967) that narrows the focus 
of ‘harm’ to a bounded framing of issues within a restricted template of policy responses. The 
notion that the very nature of UK controlled legislative frameworks (and subsequent law 
enforcement activity) could be a harm-producer is not considered, despite an abundance of 
research indicating such harms (e.g. Paoli et al., 2013).  
 
From the perspective of substance misuse policy workers, the inability to change drugs legislation 
is not perceived to be a problem, and indeed is written off almost as incidental to the central aim 
of reducing harm. In relation to the 2009 reclassification of cannabis from Class C to Class B – 
which granted greater powers to the police as well as extending the maximum sentences available 
in the courts – it was suggested by one SCS that discussions over criminal justice and drug 
classification were ‘irrelevant’. Rather, it was important to ensure that ‘…whatever strategic 
decisions are taken centrally in terms of classification we end up then with the best fit for our 
demographic and our population’ [LA/WG Substance Misuse Policy Worker]: 
 
‘…rather than argue about the class of any drug, what we talk about in our strategy are 
just the harms it can cause… from our point of view the messages to people is almost 
irrelevant to their classification in that respect because we’re looking at prevention, 
education, the risks associated, and the treatment… so we have not got dragged in to that 
… which is not actually a WG responsibility’ (SCS 2) 
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Whilst not exhaustive, this paper has identified three limiting factors to a distinct Welsh drug 
policy. The accounts presented here appear to affirm that in some crucial respects Wales is still 
‘hanging on English coat-tails’. Most significantly, however, is that the WG’s inability to change 
drugs legislation – which is then responsible for a reluctance amongst Welsh Ministers and policy 
makers to campaign for change, as well as a fairly narrow policy circle – means that Wales 
remains wedded to the UKG’s approach. Although it important to note that Wales has diverged 
in drug policy – the factors outlined here are helping to reproduce orthodoxical, UK led, positions 
at the expense of a wholly distinct or divergent Welsh drugs policy. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, executive devolution to Wales has enabled divergence to occur and is responsible 
for distinctive features in Welsh drug policy. The maturity of Welsh democratic institutions has 
enabled growth in the bureaucratic policy machinery, including data collection, which in turn has 
served to further the development of a ‘Welsh approach’ to ‘substance misuse’. There are some 
commendable aspects to this approach, which appears to be more rational, consistent, and 
progressive than that found at the UKG level. Nevertheless, owing to a set of limitations, which 
restrict the ability, and willingness of WG to fundamentally challenge or resist the unidirectional 
flow of laws and policies enacted in Westminster, any such claims to a distinct Welsh approach 
must be approached with caution. Given recent figures which reveal an increase in drug-related 
deaths in Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2017), this somewhat represents a failure to 
meaningfully, and more radically, respond in ways which reduce one of the severest harms 
caused by drug use. 
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Through the examination of drug policy in the Welsh context this paper has challenged the 
hegemony of anglocentric criminology (see Jones, 2013). Whilst the exact configuration of post-
devolution drug policy in Wales remains indisputably complex, it is no longer accurate, and 
therefore worthwhile or suitable, to approach Welsh drug policy as something simply co-
ordinated as part of a ‘broader UK strategy’ (e.g. Duke et al., 2013). The arguments presented 
here pose several further interesting and important questions for criminologists attempting to 
understand the contours of drug policy and criminal justice in Wales and the UK.  
 
First, there is the need to assess the impact made by the UKG’s decentralising and privatising 
reforms to criminal justice. Developments such as the introduction of Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs), the introduction of Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs), and 
the formation of Welsh-specific organisations such as HM Prison and Probation Service 
(HMPPS) in Wales, should be paid greater attention to assess how these interact with agenda 
setting and policy implementation within the devolved context. Second, there is a need to 
understand more comprehensively the mechanisms and forces in play at a more localised level 
across all parts of the UK, and how they may shape, and be shaped by, their broader constellations 
of governance, whether that be at a devolved, UK, or international level. In doing so, there can 
be greater certainty over whether, for example, adaptive responses `on the ground` are a result of 
the `Welsh approach`, or if they reflect broader tendencies and tensions in the `structured 
ambivalence` of drugs control (Garland, 2001).  
 
Finally, as drug policy across the UK continues to traverse the forces of constitutional change, 
future developments such as English regional devolution, the potential transfer of drug policy to 
Scotland (BBC, 2016), and the UK’s exiting of the European Union, are all likely to pose major 
challenges to the future configuration of UK drug policy. On a much broader international level, 
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opportunities for divergence and policy innovation are also likely to shape the way in which drug 
policies are configured across local, municipal, regional, state or national levels (see Brewster, 
2017; Dilley et al., 2017; Pacula et al., 2014). Indeed, the need to account for these changes is 
only likely likely to become greater as criminologists become more attuned to the fact that, as 
argued by Edwards et al., (2013: 378), policy variations within national borders “may be as great, 
or even greater" than those existing between nation states. 
 
For scholars who continue to speak of a unified and homogenous system, spirited by the 
assumption that intra-national contexts are either inconsequential or unable to resist, negotiate 
and enact policy change, the arguments presented throughout this paper should encourage critical 
criminologists to take account of the continually shifting UK terrain and the merits of developing 
a more constitutionally informed debate.	
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Notes 
 1 The Scotland Act 2016 was given Royal Assent in March 2016. The Act provides the Scottish 
Parliament powers to legislate within a number of new areas including equal opportunities, the policing 
of railways, abortion and consumer advice. 
2 This included calls to devolve policing and youth justice powers to Wales (see Wales Office, 2015). 
3 Initially named the ‘National Assembly’, from 2002 the Welsh executive was referred to as the ‘Welsh 
Assembly Government’. In May 2011, its name changed to ‘Welsh Government’. The term Welsh 
Government (WG) is used throughout this paper for purposes of consistency. 
4 Including the responsibility for tackling drug and alcohol misuse. 
5 See Wales Act 2017.  
6 Explained, in part, by the common legislative framework of the Misuse of Drugs Act. 
7 For more information about the study’s methodology, please refer to Brewster (2017: 570-572). 
8 The Welsh Office had freedoms to shape policies around health that it did not have with criminal justice, 
and it was through a health-based framework that guided the creation and direction of joined-up substance 
misuse policy. 
9 See ‘The Loop’. 
10  The level of funding awarded to the Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs) in 2000 was 
approximately £2 million a year, by 2008-09, the Substance Misuse Action Fund stood at £25 million. 
11 Wales Act 2017 (c. 4) Schedule 1 (s.54) — New Schedule 7A to the Government of Wales Act 2006.  
12 Other relevant pieces of legislation include the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.  
13 There is arguably greater freedom to speak out on controversial issues amongst ‘list’ members who are 
not required to win constituencies as part of the proportional representation system. 
14 The WG Minister for Social Services and Public Health’s responsibilities include social services, care 
in the community, older people’s care, public health, food safety, community sport, prisoner healthcare 
and the health needs of veterans. 
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